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EXCLUSION FROM THE EDUCATIONAL
PROCESS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: WHAT
PROCESS IS NOW DUE
Larry Bartlett, J.D., Ph.D.*
James McCullagh, M.S.S.W., Ed.D.**

I. INTRODUCTION

In January, 1975, the United States Supreme Court in
Goss v. Lopez 1 extended the right of procedural due process to
students who were subject to out-of-school suspensions of ten
days or less. 2 The Court's 5-4 decision 3 required public school
authorities to provide "rudimentary"4 procedures to include
"some kind of notice and ... some kind of hearing."5
Although the Court required only minimal formality to
protect a student's entitlement to a public education and to
protect a liberty interest in one's reputation, 6 Justice Powell,
in dissent, lamented the unnecessary intervention by the
Court. 7 Powell stated that the daily operation of public schools
should be left to school officials 8 and that "the
constitutionalizing of routine classroom decisions ... [was] a
significant and unwise extension of the Due Process Clause."9
Wilkinson, a sympathetic commentator of the Powell

* Associate Professor, Planning Policy and Leadership Studies, The University
of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
** Professor, Department of Social Work, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar
Falls, Iowa. Currently a J.D. candidate in the College of Law, The University of
Iowa.
1.
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
2.
!d. at 5Hl.
:1.
The majority opinion was authored by Justice White and joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall. A dissenting opinion was authored by
Justice Powell and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist.
4.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 5Hl.
5.
!d. at 579.
6.
!d. at fi74.
!d. at 5H5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
7.
X.
!d.
9.
ld. at 595.
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dissene 0 and clerk for Justice Powell during the 1971 and
1972 tenns, 11 expressed deep concern that the majority in
Goss would eventually seek to expand the rudimentary due
process afforded students and further fonnalize due process. 12
Such expansion, he feared, would result in a diversion of scarce
education resources 13 and the refocusing of educators' energies
away from the educational process. 14 Wilkinson noted that
public schools were becoming increasingly lawless. They needed
more flexibility, and not due process, he argued, in order to
control the flood of school violence. 15 Wilkinson's concern also
extended to a fear of further formalizing and extending
procedural safeguards not only to children facing suspension
and expulsion from a public school but also to a broad range of
discretionary decisions that teachers and school officials make
almost on a daily basis. 16
The primary purpose of this article is to determine what
procedural due process is now available, nearly two decades
since the Goss ruling, to public school students who may be
subject to suspension or expulsion. 17 In exploring this topic,
we also wish to assess the accuracy of concerns raised by
persons, such as Powell and Wilkinson, that a requirement of
procedural due process would greatly interfere with the
operations of public education systems. This article is limited to
court rulings involving constitutional procedural due process at
the elementary and secondary levels and does not involve

10.
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School
Superintendent, 197fi SUP. CT. REV. 2fi (197fi).
11.
J. WILKINSON, III, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW xiii
(1974).
12.
Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 44.
1.3.
ld. at 60.
ld.
14.
1fi.
ld. at 66. Wilkinson stated: "But I do question the sensitivity of any

decision to begin constitutionalizing the disciplinary process at its lowest rungs at
precisely that time when the public is deeply anxious over a lack of discipline in
the schools and when the maximum flexibility may be required by school officials
in different parts of the country to reduce the level of violence in secondary
education."
16.
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi6fi, fi97-59H (197/i) (Powell, J. dissenting);
Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 80.
419 U.S. at liH4. The Goss majority indicated that "[!longer suspensions or
17.
expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more
formal procedures." See Dolores J. Cooper & John L. Strope, Jr., Lonp-Term
Suspensions and Expulsions After Goss, li7 EDUC. L. REP. 29 (Jan. 1H, 1990), for a
straightforward review. See also Dolores Cooper & John L. Strope, Jr., Short-Term
Suspensions Fourteen Years Later, fiH EDUC. L. REP. H71 (April 12, 1990), for a
brief overview.

1]

WHAT PROCESS IS DUE

5

students in special education programs. 18

II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 19
A. When Due Process Is Applicable
The Fourteenth Amendment specifies that no State shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."20 Thus, procedural due process is required
only when government takes action that denies an individual
life, liberty, or property. Absent a denial of life, liberty, or property, under the Constitution, the government need not provide
any process to the adversely affected individual. 21
Since public schools do not engage in punishment which
normally threatens life, the focus of most decisions involving
schools is on the potential loss of property or liberty. Both have
legal meaning beyond normal lay contexts.
Property in the due process context includes a reasonable
expection of receipt of a government benefit. Such expection
must be objective, rather than subjective and is created, not in
the Constitution, but by statutes, rules and practices. 22 Thus,
a teacher under a one year contract with a college that had no
rules or policies creating a reasonable claim to reemployment

18.
This article does not analyze or critique court decisions pertaining to
suspensions or expulsions at the college or university level. For a recent discussion,
see James M. Picozzi, University Disciplinary Process: What's Fair, What's Due, and
What You Don't Get, 96 YALE L.J. 21a2 (1987).
The Court in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. ~:!05, 808, 828-29 (1988), held that under
the relevant provision of the Education of the Handicapped Act 20 U.S.C., §
1415(e)(3) (1988), children with disabilities may not be excluded from the classroom
because of "dangerous or disruptive conduct growing out of their disabilities." The
Court concluded that there is no '"dangerous' exception in the "stay-put provision"
of § 1415(e)(a) of the Act. Id. at 828. The Court, however, noted that schools
could employ such procedures as the "use of study carrels, timeouts, detention, or
the restriction of privileges." Id. at 3211. And, when necessary, the school may
suspend a student for up to 10 school days while the school considers utilizing §
1415(e)(2) to invoke the aid of the courts. !d. at 82fi-26. See also recent
commentary: Eugene A. Lincoln, Disciplinin# Handicapped Students: Questions
Unanswered in Honig v. Doe, fi1 EDllC. L. REP. 1 (March 16, 1989); Gail P.
Sorenson, Special Education Discipline in the 1!-J.'IOs, 62 Enuc. L. REP. :-J87 (Nov. 8,
1990); and, Larry Bartlett, Disciplining Handicapped Students: The Legal Issues In
Light of Honig v. Doe, fi5 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN ::lfi7 (1989).
19.
For a critical summary of the development of procedural due process see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 10-8 to 10-11 (2d ed.
1988).
20.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. fi64, fi78 (1972).
!d. at 577.
22.
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had no property interest in reemployment. 23 But, a college
teacher who could demonstrate that college documents created
an expection of continued employment after ten years of continued employment did have a property interest in reemployment.24
Thus, it can be seen that property interests protected by
procedural due process extend beyond the lay concept of property in terms of real estate, possessions or money. 25 Property
interests may take many forms, including the right to attend
public school, if provided by state law. 26
Similary, the concept of liberty has meaning beyond the lay
person's normal viewpoint. In addition to the obvious freedom
from bodily restraint and physical punishment, liberty also
involves a person's good name, reputation and standing in the
community. 27 This is especially true when the government's
action will impose a stigma that forecloses a person's ability to
take advantage of future employment opportunities. 28
Assuming that the state (e.g., a public school board) has
taken action adverse to an individual, the first step in the legal
analysis is to determine whether an individual has a protected
liberty or property interest. 29 When such interests are present, it must be determined "what process is due" 30 and whether the procedures used were constitutionally adequate. 31
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has settled on a balancing approach to determine the process that is due and the
form in which it is to be applied. 32 The factors to be considered are perhaps best formulated in the Supreme Court decision in Mathews v. Eldridge. 33 The issue in Eldridge was
whether an evidentiary hearing is required by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prior to the discontinuance of

23.
ld. at 578.
24.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
25.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
26.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975).
27.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
28.
!d.; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 705-06 (1976).
29.
Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).;
Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 260 (1987).
30.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 460 (1989) (citing
31.
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)). The Court in Helms stated that "we
must then decide whether the process afforded . . . satisfied the minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause."
32.
TRIBE, supra note 19, at 715.
33.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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Social Security disability benefit payments. 34 The six-member
majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Powell, concluded
that such a hearing was not required. 35
The Court specified three distinct factors that are critical
to determining what process is due. 36 The factors to be included are 1) consideration of the importance of the individual's
interest that will be taken away by government action, 37 2)
the risk of error in making the decision and possible benefits of
requiring additional procedural safeguards, and 3) the
government's interest in the activity involved and the difficulty
created for the government by requiring additional due process
procedures. 38 In regard to the third criterion, the Court concluded that although financial cost alone is not the controlling
factor in determining whether due process requires a particular
procedural safeguard, the public or government interest "in
conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor
that must be weighed."39 After balancing the three competing
factors in Eldridge, the Court held that no evidentiary hearing
is required prior to the termination of social security disability
benefits. 40
An important subsequent application of the Eldridge threefactor test involved the constitutionality of disciplinary corporal
punishment in the public schools. 41 In a 5-4 opinion, also
authored by Justice Powell, the Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require public schools to provide notice
and a hearing prior to the imposition of corporal punishment so
long as corporal punishment is authorized and limited by the
state's common or statutory law. 42 The Court's balancing of
the factors outlined in Eldridge was obvious in its reasoning;
"[i]n view of the low incidence of abuse, the openness of our
schools, and the common-law safeguards that already exist, the
risk of error that may result in violation of a schoolchild's substantive rights can only be regarded as minimal."43 Justice
Powell clearly stated that additional procedural safeguards

34.
35.
36.
37.
3R.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

!d.
ld.
ld.
ld.
!d.
ld.
ld.

at 323.
at 349.
at 33fi.

at 348.
at 349.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 6fil (1977).
!d. at 682.
ld.
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were unwarranted in light of potential additional burdens on
school officials. 44 He noted that the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of
school officials to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools. 45 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, was reluctant to impose additional procedural safeguards in corporal
punishment situations out of a concern that such safeguards
would "entail a significant intrusion into an area of primary
educational responsibility."46

B. What Process Is Due?
Mter determining the presence of life, liberty or property
interests that require procedural due process protection, it then
must be determined which specific elements of due process
must be provided. It is acknowledged that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands. 47 As noted by the Court in a decision not
involving education, "[t]he very nature of due process negates
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation."48 This flexibility in due process
requirements sometimes leads to disagreement about the specific elements required. There is general agreement, however,
that due process requires, as a minimum, notice of alleged improprieties and the opportunity to respond to the allegations in
some type of hearing.
As stated in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court consistently
has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a protected interest. 49 But the
right to be heard has little value unless the person is informed
that the matter is pending and can choose how to respond. 50
Thus, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential requirements of procedural due process. 51 Notice must convey

!d.
!d.; see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi65, fiH9-90 (197fi).
ln![raham, 430 U.S. at 6H2.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, a41 U.S. 123, 162-63 (19fi1)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Friendly, infra note 55, at 127H-79; Hart v.
Ferris State College, fi57 F. Supp. 1379, 1aH7 (W.D. Mich. 198a).
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, a67 U.S. HH6, H9fi
48.
44.
4fi.
46.
47.

(1961).
49.
424 U.S. at 333; see also, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
5:~2. fi42 (198!').
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., aa9 U.S. ao6, 314 (19fi0).
50.
/d. at a!a-14; See also, Goldberg v. Kelley, a97 U.S. 2fi4, 267-6H (1970).
51.
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information regarding the allegations against the person52 and
must be given in a timely manner53 so the person may prepare a defense.
The question becomes what elements of due process are
required at the hearing. Judge Henry Friendly, 54 a highly respected jurist, has provided a detailed discussion of the elements of a fair hearing. 55 He first noted that the hearing tribunal must be unbiased or impartial. 56 The Supreme Court
has determined that there is a presumption that those who sit
on tribunals are unbiased, and has noted that a presumption of
impartiality can be rebutted only by a showing of conflict of
interest or some other specific reason for disqualification. 57
According to Judge Friendly, an essential element of a fair
hearing is that a person must be provided an opportunity to
prepare his or her case regarding the allegations contained in
the notice. 58 He also stated that due process generally provides the right to call witnesses on behalf of the person, to
know about the evidence upon which the allegations in the
notice are based, to have decisions made only upon evidence
presented at the hearing, 59 the right to legal counsel, the
making of a record, a written statement and a finding of
facts, 60 public attendance, and the right to judicial review. 61
The last two are seldom discussed in court decisions involving
schools. Judge Friendly noted, as will be discussed later, that
the right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is
highly debated, and the courts are greatly divided on the issue.62
The extent to which all of these elements of procedural due
process are required, or not required, must be viewed in light of
the unique aspects of the public school setting, the Eldridge
three factor list, and most importantly, Goss v. Lopez. 63

52.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
53.
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267.
54.
Then a judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
55.
56.
ld. at 1279.
fi7.
Schweiker v. McClure, 4fi6 U.S. 118, 19fi (1982); Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976).
58.
Friendly, supra note 5fi, at 1280-81.
ld. at 1282.
59.
60.
Id. at 1287, 1291.
61.
ld. at 1293-94.
ld. at 1288.
62.
68.
E.g., Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 9fi (8rd Cir. 1989); Carey v. Maine
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 918 (D. Me. 1990).
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MINIMAL DUE PROCESS IN

THE SCHOOLS

A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1971 a number of students were suspended from the
Columbus Public School System in Ohio. 64 Subsequently, nine
student plaintiffs, accused of engaging in demonstrations, refusing to obey a principal's directive, and attacking a police
officer on the scene, challenged the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Ohio statute and the disciplinary policies
set forth in the Columbus Public School Administrative
Guide. 65 Of the nine plaintiffs, six were high school students
whose disruptive behavior, observed by a school administrator,
resulted in 10-day suspensions from school. 66 Dwight Lopez,
also a high school student, 67 was suspended for a disturbance
in a lunch room that he claimed he did not commit, and no
contrary evidence was presented at trial by school administrators.68 An eighth plaintiff, a junior high school student, was
initially arrested but not formally charged for being present at
a high school demonstration and then suspended by school
officials for ten days. 69 The Court noted that absent testimony
by school authorities, there was no indication of what factors
school authorities considered in deciding to suspend the student. 70 The Court remarked that no testimony was offered regarding the suspension of a ninth student plaintiff. 71
A three-judge district court panel held that the students
were not accorded appropriate due process of law because they
were suspended without a hearing prior to suspension or with-

64.
Lopez v. Williams, 872 F. Supp. 1279, 12R1-H2 (S.D. Ohio 197a) (three-judge
panel), affd, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). It is well acknowledged that Goss was triggered
by numerous racial incidents between black and white students. However, the
Court declined to comment on such tensions. See Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 8082.
6fi.
ld. at 1281.
66.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi65, 569-70, n.4 (197fi). One of these students was
given a second ten-day suspension for misconduct occurring on another occasion but
which followed immediately on returning to school. See n. 4. Thus, the Court had
the opportunity to address suspensions longer than ten days but declined to do so.
ld. at 569-70.
67.
68.
ld. at 570.
ld. at fi70-71. It should be noted that the Supreme Court holding in CTOss
69.
v. Lopez also applies to students in junior high school and probably to students in
elementary school.
70.
ld.
71.
ld. at 571.
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in a reasonable time after suspension. 72 The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court by administrators
of the Columbus Public School System. 73

B. Students Have a Constitutionally Protected Interest in a
Public Education
The Supreme Court concluded that a ten day suspension
from school is a legally significant loss and may be imposed
only with provision of appropriate procedural due process. 74
The Court noted that protected property interests are not created by the Constitution but are usually created by independent
sources, such as state statutes, which entitle citizens to certain
benefits. 75 Justice White, writing for the majority, indicated
that while a right to a public education is not constitutionally
mandated, 76 there are legitimate claims of entitlement to a
public education that are recognized as a property interest
when state law provides both for a public education and requires school attendance. 77 Such interests are protected by the
Due Process Clause and may not be taken away without the
provision of minimal due process elements. 78
The majority also concluded that short-term suspensions
infringed on a student's liberty interests which are protected by
the Due Process Clause. 79 The majority noted that even shortterm suspensions could damage the students' reputation and
standing with their fellow pupils and teachers, and school records of the incident could interfere with later opportunities for
higher education and employment.~"~ 0 This view of reputation
being a liberty interest was revised in a subsequent Supreme
Court ruling, and now state action must stigmatize a person's
reputation in the community in order for a liberty interest to
be involved. 81
The Court rejected an argument that the Due Process
Clause applies only when a student is subjected to a grievous

Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. !'i6!'i, !'i67 (197fi).
!d. at fi76.
!d. at fi72-78.
!d. at fi72.
!d. at Fin.
!d. at fi74.
!d.
!d. at fi7fi.
Hl.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 698, 712 (1976); Boster v. Philpot, 64Fi F. Supp.
798, ROfi (D. Kan. 19R6).
72.
73.
74.
7Fi.
76.
77.
7R.
79.
RO.
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loss or severe detriment. 82 It recognized that constitutional
due process protections were triggered when the property loss
was more than de minimis. The Court, citing Board of Regents
v. Roth, 83 commented that courts must look to the nature of
the interest at stake, and concluded that a ten day suspension
is not de minimis. 84 It concluded that because an education is
of such great import in the modern world, even suspension
from school for as little as ten days is not so minor a penalty
that due process protections could be ignored. 85

C. The Process That Is Due for Short Term Suspensions
The majority in Goss concluded that for brief suspensions
of ten days or less, a trial-type hearing is not required, but due
process does require that the student be given either oral or
written notice of the charges; if the charges are denied, a description of the evidence and an opportunity to present his or
her side of the situation must be given. 86 When these rudimentary hearings occur, the student must be told what misconduct has been charged, the reasons for the accusation, and the
student must be allowed to explain his or her version of the
events surrounding the incident. 87 The Court stated that such
procedures may occur immediately following notice or they may
occur at a later time. 88 The Court added that the hearing between the student and school officials can be an informal giveand-take, so long as it allows the student to explain his or her
views. 89 The primary purpose of the rudimentary hearing process is to assure that mistaken findings of student misconduct
do not result in an arbitrary exclusion from school. 90 The
Court noted that it was not requiring anything more than what
a "fair-minded" principal would undertake in order to avoid
errors in making decisions. 91

82.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi6fi, fi7fi (197fi).
83.
408 U.S. fi64 (1972).
84.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 56fi, 57fi-76 (197fi).
!d.
8fi.
86.
!d. at fi8l.
87.
!d. at 582.
!d.
88.
89.
Id. at .584. In Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 4.'3/'i U.S. 78, 8/'i-86 (1978), the
Court, in dicta, essentially reiterated its position. "All that Goss required was an
'informal give-and-take' between the student and the administrative body dismissing him that would, at least, give the student 'the opportunity to characterize
his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context.'"
!d.
90.
91.
!d. at 583.

1]

WHAT PROCESS IS DUE

13

Notice and a rudimentary hearing should normally be
provided to the student prior to the student's removal from
school, but the Court identified certain situations that do not
require notice and hearing prior to removal. 92 The Court stated that immediate removal is appropriate when students pose a
continuing danger to themselves or to others or present a continuing threat of disruption to the educational environment. 93
In these situations, the student may be suspended prior to receipt of due process, but must be provided with notice and at
least a rudimentary hearing as soon as reasonably possible. 94

D. The Process that Is Not Required for Suspensions of Ten
Days or Less
Short-term suspensions do not require that the student be
afforded an opportunity to be represented by legal counsel, to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, or to call witnesses to
support his or her side of the situation. 95 The Court's rationale for limiting the availability of additional procedures included concern that such requirements would over burden
school administrators and result in expensive court-like proceedings. 96 The Court also feared that further formalizing of
the process of short-term suspension hearings would result in a
limiting of the educational effectiveness of suspensions. 97
Though additional procedural safeguards are not required
in Goss, the Court noted that a school administrator could
decide, when warranted, to allow cross-examination, the presentation of student's own witnesses and access to legal counsel.98 In appropriate situations, such as when known personality conflicts exist between an accusing teacher and a student, a
reasonable school administrator may seek to reach a fair result
by allowing additional procedural rights.

IV.

DUE PROCESS SINCE Goss V. LOPEZ

A. When is an Educational Deprivation Protected?
In Goss, the Supreme Court did not state that all student

92.
9::1.
94.
9fi.
96.

97.
9H.

ld.
I d.
ld.
ld.
I d.
I d.
ld.

at fiH2.
at fiH2-H::!.
at fiH::!.

at fiH4.
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infractions require procedural due process - only those that
involve a significant student interest. In reviewing due process
issues, courts must initially determine if the deprivation suffered by a student results in "the total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period."99 If a deprivation is legally insignificant, then a property interest is not
implicated and there is no requirement of constitutional due
process. The Court in Goss v. Lopez clearly indicated that a ten
day suspension from school is significant 100 but left open the
possibility that a shorter suspension may be de minimis. 101
Justice Powell, writing a dissenting opinion, commented critically that a one-day suspension now involves "a new constitutional right." 102 Judge Friendly also commented that "a hearing may be required for a suspension of two days - or perhaps
even two hours - at least when the sanction is noted on the
student's record." 103
Because the Court in Goss expressly addressed only out-ofschool, short-term suspensions not exceeding ten days, it has
been left to lower courts to extend the spirit of the law as outlined in Goss. To further understand when a property or liberty
interest is implicated, a review of subsequent lower court rulings will focus on in-school and out-of-school suspensions and
other sanctions that may be imposed on students, such as loss
of academic credit and restrictions in participation in extra-curricular activities.

1. Out-of-school suspensions
A three-day suspension has been held legally significant
because class-time missed can not be made up and, suspensions
are noted on a student's school records which are often available to prospective employers and college admissions personnel.104 Other courts in situations involving vandalism, insubordination, and fighting have also implicitly acknowledged that
a three-day suspension implicated a property interest and

99.
!d. at 576.
!d.
100.
101.
!d. The Court perhaps intimated that some suspension for less than 10
days may be for only a "trivial period." The majority did, however, note that due
process attaches for suspensions of "10 days or less." !d. at 581.
102.
!d. at 585 (Powell, J., dissenting).
103.
Friendly, supra note 55, at 1275, n. 50.
104.
Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. 812, 81.5 (W.D. Va. 1977). The court did
not specifically address whether a liberty or property interest was implicated but
one may surmise that the court was referring to a property interest.
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therefore was not de minimis. 105 The Sixth Circuit has ruled
that a seven-day suspension was controlled by the Goss ruling. 106 The court decisions referenced here did not expressly
address the issue of liberty interest but generally referred only
to the loss of a property interest.

2. In-school suspensions
In-school isolation in a detention room has been found to
be a deprivation of education like the effect of an out-of-school
suspension. 107 In Mississippi, a high school student who
would not submit to corporal punishment was initially suspended from school for three days and then for an indefinite
period until she would accept paddling. 108 Subsequently the
school board allowed the student to return without submitting
to paddling but decided that she would be placed in a school
detention room. 109 The court indicated that not all in-school
detentions would be equivalent to out-of-school suspensions,
but determinations would depend on the extent of the deprivation of normal educational opportunities. 110 If exclusion from
the educational process was total within the school, it would be
equivalent to an out-of-school suspension. 111 If in-school isolation was found to be equivalent to out-of-school suspension,
then the days absent from the normal classroom would be combined. If the total time of suspension exceeded ten days, more
formal procedures than those found in Goss would be required.112
In an Arkansas case, a special education student's substan-

lOfi.
Students who had admitted vandalism of a grade school were suspended for
three days in Boster v. Philpot 64fi F. Supp. 79R, R04 (D. Kan. 1986). A student
was given a three-day suspension for insubordination in Wayne County Bd. of
Educ. v. Tyre, 404 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. App. 1991). A student was given a three-day
suspension for striking another student, but the suspension was not required to be
served in a subsequent school year when the school did not impose the sanction
during the school year in which the incident occurred in Rossman v. Conran, fi72
N.E.2d 728 (Ohio App. 1988).
106.
Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 11fi9 (6th Cir. 19R7).
107.
Cole v. Newton Special Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 676 F. Supp. 749, 752
(S.D. Miss. 1987), a{fd, Rfi3 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1988). The court did not indicate
whether a liberty or property interest was implicated. The court assumed that a
student had an interest in attending school but primarily addressed the question of
what procedural safeguards were due.
lOR.
ld. at 751.
109.
ld.
110.
ld.
111.
ld. at 7fi2.
ld.
112.
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tive due process rights were found not to have been violated
when he received a three-day in-school suspension due to tardiness and was isolated in a special classroom. 113 The classroom had adequate floor space, lighting, and windows, and the
special education placement committee had determined that
the suspension would not adversely affect the student. The
student completed all his assigned work and did not fall behind
in his school work as a result of being placed in the special
classroom. 114 Because the student was not actually excluded
from the educational process, the court found that no property
interest in a public education was implicated. 115 The court
added that procedural due process was not implicated because
on the facts, this three-day in-school suspension was de minimis.116
Similarly, a student who was given a three-day in-school
suspension and an eleven-day restriction, including exclusion
from the senior class outing and extra-curricular activities, did
not receive a punishment sufficient to constitute deprivation of
a property or liberty interest. 117 The punishment assigned
was considered de minimis because the student was expected to
do assigned school work while serving the in-school suspension. 118 The senior class outing alone was not found to be a
constitutionally protected civil right. 119 The student's alleged
liberty interest in his reputation was summarily dismissed. The
court concluded that the student's reputation was not seriously
damaged by his being kept in school with the restrictions imposed.120
In another decision involving an in-school suspension, a
sixth-grade student was placed in "time out" within his classroom.121 The student was permitted to remain in the classroom and perform class work and was allowed to attend all
other classes in other parts of the school. He was allowed to
leave "time out" for appropriate reasons, such as use of a
restroom, and he was not physically restrained or subjected to

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
1987).

Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir. 1988).
!d. at 566.
!d. at 563.
!d.
Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 772 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
!d.
!d.
!d. at 773.
Dickens v. Johnson County Bd. of Educ., 661 F. Supp. 155, 156 (E.D. Tenn.
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pain. 122 The court concluded that interference with the boy's
educational opportunity was trivial, and neither a property nor
liberty interest was implicated. 123 A similar result was found
when a student alleged violation of his due process rights when
he was placed on probation without any actual school time
missed. 124

3. Loss of academic credit
A state supreme court has concluded, in accordance with
its interpretation of Goss v. Lopez, that loss of academic credit
for the entire semester was a property interest qualifying for
protection under the Due Process Clause. 125 The decision involved a sixteen-year-old sophomore who had drunk two or
three sips of beer in her home before going to school on the last
day of the school term. 126

4. Participation in academic programs
A student who had been discharged from an elite high
school for failure to meet academic requirements and involuntarily transferred to a less selective school, argued that she had
been denied procedural due process. 127 The court first distinguished the standards applicable to academic discharge from
those related to misconduct and then noted that courts give
considerable deference to education professionals in matters of
academic standards. 128 It then determined that due process
was satisfied in this instance, but noted that academic discipline does not implicate the same legal requirements as discipline for misconduct. 129 The court did not indicate what procedures would be required if, as in this case, the student could
not attend any local high school. 130 One court has upheld student arguments that Goss should be applied to involuntary
transfers between attendance centers for disciplinary reasons.131 In a completely different situation, another court has
122.
ld.
123.
ld. at 158.
124.
Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 1002-03 (D. Me. 1982).
125.
Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 500 So.2d 455, 458 (Miss. 1986).
126.
ld. at 456.
127.
Spencer v. New York City Bd. of Higher Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 358, 359 (Sup.
Ct. 1986).
128.
ld. at 359.
129.
ld.
130.
ld.
131.
Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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held that expulsion from a private school for misconduct does
not require the protections of procedural due process unless
substantial state action can be demonstrated. 132
A student's decision to graduate earlier than originally
planned because of what she claimed became an oppressive
school environment after her removal as head cheerleader was
found by one court not to constitute deprivation of either a
property or liberty interest. 133 No property interest was implicated because students are afforded only the opportunity to
graduate, not to graduate on a specified date. 134 In the absence of proven damage to her reputation or the school's publicizing her dismissal as a cheerleader, no liberty interest was
involved. 135
In the absence of a statute or rule creating a reasonable
expectation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit determined that a high school student who was not
allowed to enroll in certain courses did not have a property
interest in a specific course of study. 136 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York has ruled
that the shortening of the school day by forty-five minutes per
day for two days a week in an effort to economize was not a
deprivation implicating due process rights. 137 The court commented that the state did not significantly limit a right to an
education any more than when decisions are made regarding
curriculum requirements, the assignment of study halls, or
requiring attendance at a school assembly. 138
The United States District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina found that a student who was denied the
opportunity to participate in a graduation ceremony because he
was in violation of the dress code for the ceremony did not have
a property right in participation nor was he deprived of a liberty right. 139 In a subsequent ruling on the issue of a property
right in participation in graduation ceremonies in California,
another court ruled that even the completing of all graduation

1:32.
Wisch v. Sanford Sch., Inc., 420 F. Supp. U!lO, 181:3 (D. Del. 1976) (citing
Reitman v. Mulkey, :3R7 U.S. 869 (1967)).
1:{:3.
Haverkamp v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 880, 689 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (D. Kan.
1986).
184.
ld.
1:35.
ld.
1:36.
Arundar v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 620 F.2d 49:3, 494 (5th Cir. 19RO).
1:11.
Znll v. Anker, 414 F. Supp. 1024, 102R (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
1:38.
Id.
1:39.
Fowler v. Williamson, 448 F. Supp. 497, 501-02 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
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requirements did not give rise to a protected property interest
in participating in graduation ceremonies. 140 The second court
also rejected a liberty interest argument, noting that the student was not prevented from attending graduation ceremonies
and that school officials did not publicize his situation. 141 In
another ruling, a court held that the use of placement tests to
assign students at different achievement levels in a non-graded
elementary school did not implicate a protected property interest. 142

5. Activities that facilitate school attendance
Parents and students have even challenged the implementation of a school policy that temporarily suspended certain
school bus routes when students violated rules pertaining to
proper conduct on the bus. 143 The First Circuit held that temporary suspensions of bus routes were de minimis because the
loss resulted only in inconvenience and not in a loss of educational opportunity. 144

6. Extracurricular activities
School attendance is usually required by state statute for
school age children; also mandated is a course of required instruction sufficient to obtain a high school diploma. However,
numerous other school activities not directly related to instruction are arguably essential to a well-rounded educational experience. Students are therefore encouraged to participate in
activities such as student government, athletics, school bands
and orchestras, and student newspapers and yearbooks. Deprivation of these extra-curricular activities has been periodically
challenged by students as a violation of their property or liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Goss decision involved the issue of "total exclusion
from the educational process" in the context of a ten day out-of140.
Swany v. San Ramon Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 720 F. Supp. 764, 77:-l-74
(N.D. Cal. 19R9).
141.
!d. at 77fi-76.
142.
Smith v. Dallas County Bd. of Educ., 4RO F. Supp. 1324, 13:-lR (S.D. Ala.
1979).
143.
Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 679 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 19R2). The suspension
"policy was applied to instances of serious disruption, significant vandalism, or
danger." ld. at 2RO. Under the policy, school officials would first try to identify the
guilty students but, when the students could not be identified, the school route
would be suspended for a period not exceeding five days.
144.
!d. at 2R2.
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school suspension. 145 A year later, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had occasion to interpret the
meaning of the phrase "educational process" in the context of a
transfer rule that barred transferring students from athletic
competition for one year. 146
The educational process is a broad and comprehensive concept
with a variable and indefinite meaning. It is not limited to
classroom attendance but includes innumerable separate
components, such as participation in athletic activity and
membership in school clubs and social groups, which combine
to provide an atmosphere of intellectual and moral advancement. We do not read Goss to establish a property interest
subject to constitutional protection in each of these separate
components. 147

The Tenth Circuit held that interscholastic athletic participation is not a constitutionally protected right. 148
A previous decision involving a similar imposition of athletic ineligibility for transfer students supported the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Albach. 149 The court concluded that the
property interest in an education involved the many combined
activities of school attendance and could not be subdivided into
separate property rights, each protected by the Constitution.
According to the court, to find otherwise would result in a due
process hearing being requirement for each removal from an
athletic team, club, or activity. 150
A 1992 ruling in Arkansas agreed and held that recognizing a property right in athletics, band, theater and choir would
result in a deluge of litigation by students. 151 The court stated that participation in athletics was not a constitutionally
protected claim of entitlement, but merely an expectation. 152
On a more philosophical note, the court stated that students

145.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
146.
Albach v. Odie, 531 F.2d 983 (lOth Cir. 1976).
147.
!d. at 985.
148.
!d. at 984-85; see also Boster v. Philpot, 645 F. Supp. 798, R05-06 CD. Kan.,
1986) (finding no right to attend athletic contests).
149.
Dallam v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 391 F. Supp. 35R (M.D. Pa. 1975).
150.
!d. at 361; see also Berschback v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Dist., 397
N.W.2d 234, 242 (Mich. App. 1986) (citing Albach with approval); Tiffany v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc, 726 P.2d 231, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 19R6) (quoting
Albach with approval); Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 552
F.2d 9Rl (6th Cir. 1976); Herbert v. Ventetudo, 63R F.2d 5 (1st Cir. l9RO).
151.
McFarlin v. Newport Special Sch. Dist., 7R4 F. Supp 5R9 (E.D. Ark. 1992).
152.
!d. at 592.
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should recognize that it is a fact of life that on occasion all
people are subjected to arbitrary and unjust decision making.I53
In 1986, the Kansas federal district court analyzed anumber of cases regarding the question of a property right in extracurricular activities involving a student removed as a cheerleader, and concluded that there is no federally protected property right in interscholastic athletics under the majority
rule. 154 The court, however, acknowledged three groups of
cases that held that students have constitutionally protected
interests in extracurricular activities. 155 These courts reasoned that participation in varsity athletics constituted a property interest because of students' potential future educational
or professional sports opportunities, because participation in
such activities is an integral part of the total education process,
or because the denial of the right to participate may violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 156 The Kansas court followed the
majority view and held that no property interest existed in
being a head cheerleader or a member of the cheerleading
squad. 157 The court reasoned that future educational opportunities are mere expectations and are insufficient to create a
constitutionally protected property interest. 158
Court decisions since 1986 have generally followed the
majority rule that students do not have a property or liberty
interest in a variety of extracurricular activities. 159 In one, a
high school senior and defending state champion wrestler was
declared ineligible to continue on the wrestling team for misconduct he and three other males committed with a young

1fi::!.
!d. at fi93.
Haverkamp v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 380, 689 F. Supp. 10fifi, 10fi7 (D. Kan.
1fi4.
19R6); see Bernstein v. Menard, fifi7 F. Supp. 90, 91 (1982) (finding no constitutional right to play a trumpet in a high school band).
lfifi.
!d.
lfi6.
!d.; see e.p., Boyd v. Bd. of Educ. of McGehee Sch. Dist., 612 F. Supp. 86
(D. Ark. 19/'lfi); Kelley v. Metro Bd. of Educ. of Nashville, 293 F. Supp. 48fi (M.D.
Tenn. 1968); Gilprin v. Kansas State High Sch. Activities Ass'n Inc., 877 F. Supp.
1283 (D. Kan. 1974).
!d. at 10fiR.
1fi7.
1fi8.
!d.
lfi9.
See, e.g., Simkins v. South Dakota Sch. Activities Ass'n, 484 N.W.2d 367,
368 (S.D. 1989) (fmding that a student who transferred from one school to a Bible
academy while his parents remained in the former school district which rendered
student ineligible to participate in interscholastic athletics for one year did not
have a life, liberty, or property interest as he had "not suffered a 'total exclusion'
from the educational process"); Mississippi High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Ferris, fi01
So.2d 393, 397 (Miss. 1989).
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woman in the student's home. 160 The student was held not to
have a liberty or property interest notwithstanding his outstanding four-year high school wrestling record or the likelihood that if he continued to excel in wrestling tournaments, he
would receive a college scholarship. 161
The Sixth Circuit has held that participation in an election
for student council president was not protected by the Due
Process Clause, notwithstanding the possibility that the winner
would receive a modest scholarship. 162 In another decision involving elective student office, a different court ruled that a
student does not have a constitutionally protected interest in
running for high school student office. 163
In Pegram v. Nelson, a junior high school student received
a ten day suspension and additional school restrictions under a
probation that prevented him from remaining on school
grounds after 3:15 p.m. or participating in or attending school
activities for the remainder of the school year which was approximately four months. 164 Although acknowledging that
there was no property interest in participating in extracurricular activities, 165 the court suggested that depending upon the
circumstances, "total exclusion from participating in ... extracurricular activities for a lengthy period of time could ... be a
sufficient deprivation to implicate due process." 166 The court
declined to determine whether the student qualified for procedural due process but assumed that even if the student did
qualify, he had previously received all the process that was due
at the time he was suspended from school. 167 Applying the
Eldridge testi 68 the court concluded that the process required
under Goss was sufficient. 169 However, the court did leave
open the possibility that total exclusion from extracurricular

160.
Brands v. Sheldon Community Sch., 671 F. Supp. 627, 629 (N.D. Iowa
1987).
!d. at 631; see also Thompson v. Fayette County Pub. Sch., 786 S.W.2d R79,
161.
882 (Ky.App. 1990) (finding no property right to continue on wrestling team when
grade point average went below 2.0).
162.
Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
723 (1990).
16.'3.
Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 145/i, 1461 (E.D.
Ark. 1990).
164.
469 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
16/i.
!d. at 1139.
!d. at 1140.
166.
!d. at 1141.
167.
168.
See supra text accompanying notes 33-46.
169.
Pegram, 469 F. Supp. at 1140-41.
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activities for a semester or longer might qualify as a property
interest. 170

B. When Can a Student be Removed from School
Prior to Notice and Hearing?
In Goss, the Supreme Court stated that as a general rule
notice and hearing should precede a student's removal from
school. 171 It acknowledged, however, that situations arise that
do not require hearings to be held prior to suspensions. 172
The Court indicated that students may be removed immediately from school when their "presence poses a continuing danger
to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the
academic process." 173 The Court indicated that in such situations notice and hearing should be provided in a reasonable
time thereafter. 174
In one subsequent lower court decision, high school students who were suspended from all classes one day prior to
rescheduled suspension hearings argued that they had been denied due process. 175 The court, citing the Goss analysis for exceptions to prior notice and hearing, first indicated that the
students' use of drugs just outside the school would have justified immediate removal from the school by school officials. 176
The court then noted that the hearing delay actually resulted
from mutual agreement of the students' attorney and the
school's attorney. 177 The court concluded that the hearing
conducted one day after removal of the students from school,
was held as soon as feasible by the school officials and was sufficiently prompt to meet the Goss requirements. 178
In another decision, a group of vocal and disruptive students led a walkout of students from a high school. The inci-

170.
!d. at 1140.
171.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975); see Everett v. Marcase, 426 F.
Supp. 397, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (ruling that a student must remain in school pending a hearing, unless an emergency exists).
!d.
172.
ln.
!d.
174.
!d.
175.
White v. Salisbury Township Sch. Dist., 588 F. Supp. 608, 613 (E.D. Pa.
19R4).
176.
!d. at 613. The district judge, relying on the Goss analysis for exceptions to
prior notice and hearing, indicated that the misconduct of student-plaintiffs "certainly raises the possibility of danger to persons or property as well as the threat
of disruption of the academic process."
177.
!d. at 614.
17R.
!d.
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dent was partially related to interracial trouble at the
school. 179 The principal later announced over the local radio
station that all student participants in the walkout were suspended for ten days. 180 Obviously, no rudimentary hearings
were held prior to the suspensions. However, within three
school days, conferences were held with all the students and
their parents, and all suspensions were ended. 181 The Fifth
Circuit ruled that because of the ongoing threat of disruption to
the education process, there had been no reasonable opportunity for hearings on the day of the suspension. It found that postsuspension hearings held with each student and his or her
parents did not violate the procedural due process rights of the
students. 18:l

C. When is a Tribunal Not Impartial?
The Goss opinion did not specifically address the issue of
impartiality of hearing officers. Rather, the Court appears to
presume, with respect to short-term suspensions, that school
disciplinarians will proceed in good faith. 183 It is also clear
that school officials may perform multiple functions and still be
presumed to be fair: observer of misconduct, provider of notice,
hearing officer, and dispenser of short-term suspension. 184
However, if an administrator makes a disciplinary recommendation, such as an involuntary disciplinary transfer from one
school to another, neither that administrator nor anyone subordinate should be the decision maker. 185 It would permissible
for a person in a superior administrative position to make a
final ruling. 186
In a case arising in Virginia, a student's parents alleged

179.
Sweet v. Childs, fi07 F.2d 67fi, 678 (fith Cir. 197fi), rehf;; denied fi18 F.2d
820, :321 (5th Cir. 1971i).
180.
!d.
181.
!d.
182.
!d. at 681.
188.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 561i, 580 (197fi). The Court stated that a presumption exists that "hearing officers . . . are unbiased [citations omitted]. This
showing can he rebutted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific
reason for disqualification." See also Schweiker v. McClure, 41i6 U.S. 188, 191i
(1982); Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976)
(holding that school board not biased in termination of striking teachers); Salazar
v. Laty, 761 F. Supp. 41i, 47 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (citing Goss as requiring an unbiased
decision maker).
1R4.
!d. at n82.
185.
Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. :397, 402 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
186.
!d.
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that the student's due process rights had been violated when a
principal suspended the student for a second time. 187 The student had been reinstated by the school after the first suspension because officials were uncertain whether due process had
been satisfied. The parents argued that because the principal
was involved in the first suspension proceeding and because he
was an employee of the school, he was not an impartial decision maker at the subsequent hearing. 188 The court rejected
the arguments, noting that there was no evidence of actual
bias, that finders of fact are not considered biased merely because they are familiar with the facts, and that due process
does not prohibit the finder of fact from being an employee of
the school. tR!J
A Delaware state court has held that a hearing officer who
was an employee of the same school district as the student
must be fair and impartial, but that due process does not require a fair and impartial hearing officer be chosen from among
non-employees of the district. 190 Similarly, the California Supreme Court has held that a state statute providing for school
district employees who are not employed at the student's school
of attendance to serve on hearing panels considering expulsion,
does not violate a student's due process rights. 191
An interesting illustration of this situation arose in Texas,
when an assistant principal involved in the initiation and investigation of drug use and sale found evidence through a
search of the student. 192 The student was suspended from
school for three days, and a review hearing was scheduled to
consider the possibility of a long-term suspension. 193 The assistant principal also served as a judge on a campus-review
board that recommended suspension for the remaining school
year/ 94 although the suspension actually lasted only about
eight weeks. 195 The student argued in court that the assistant

1R7.
Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. R12, R14 (W.D. Va. 1977).
1RR.
!d. at R14, R16.
1H9.
!d.; seP also Long v. Thornton Township High Sch. Dist. 20fi, 823 F.R.D.
1R6, 192 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding that dual roles does not automatically disqualify
a decision maker); Gonzales v. McEuen, 43fi F. Supp. 460, 464 (C.D. Cal. 1977)
(holding that some familiarity with the facts does not disqualify a decision maker).
190.
Rucker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., fi 17 A.2d 708, 70fi (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 6fi4 P.2d 242, 247 (Cal.
191.
19H3).
192.
Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 261 (fith Cir. 19Hfi).
193.
!d.
!d.
194.
19fi.
!d. at 262.
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principal could not be an impartial member of the review board
because he had previously been an investigator and then a
witness before the board. 196 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
absent actual demonstrated bias the student did not receive an
impartial hearing, a school official may serve as both an investigator and a hearing officer. 197
Courts have also found that when a school board goes into
closed-session deliberations and includes school officials who
participated in the deliberations, even though they previously
engaged in such roles as prosecutor and adverse witnesses in
the hearing, the school board may exclude the student and his
counsel. 198 The Seventh Circuit reasoned, relying on Goss,
that due process requirements are met when the student is
provided an opportunity to present his or her story to the
board. 199
Consistent with the holding discussed above, the Sixth
Circuit has held that school boards may allow school officials,
including the superintendent, involved in prior disciplinary
actions to attend and participate in closed sessions, but deny
access to a student and his attorney. 200 The court added, in a
footnote, that school officials could not have been decision makers in a pre-expulsion hearing if they "possessed either a preexisting animus towards him or had developed a bias because
of their involvement in the incident ... "201
The court decisions are inconsistent on the issue of the role
of the school board attorney and whether his or her activity results in a biased school board decision maker. It has been held
that a school board attorney may engage in multiple roles at an
expulsion hearing - including prosecution, ruling on motions
and objections made by the student's counsel, and advising the
school board - where a student receives a thirty day suspension, is represented by an attorney, and is afforded an opportunity to present his version of the alleged misconduct. 202
However, one year later another federal district court
reached a contrary result. That court concluded that when
school district attorneys performed the dual role of prosecutor

196.
ld. at 264.
ld.
197.
198.
Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unif. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 826 F.2d fi26, fi29
(7th Cir. 1987).
ld. (citing Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1972).
199.
Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 927 (6th cir. 1988).
200.
201.
ld.
202.
Alex v. Allen, 409 F. Supp . .379, .387-88 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
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and advisor to the school board in an expulsion hearing before
the board, a presumption of bias existed. 203 Interestingly, in
the same decision the court ruled that the superintendent's
mere presence at board deliberations violated the students' due
process rights to an impartial hearing tribunal because the
superintendent served as both the chief advisor to the board
and chief of the administrative team prosecuting the students.204 This ruling is in sharp contrast to the Sixth Circuit's
ruling that allowed superintendent participation in board deliberations as discussed above. 205

D. What Type of Notice is Required?
Whenever proposed discipline by school officials involves a
protected property or liberty interest, students "must be given
some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing."206 Effective notice requires that a student be told what the student
stands accused of doing and what evidence exists to substantiate the accusation. 207 This is required so that the student has
a fair opportunity to explain his or her side of the situation.208 That is why notice is essential to due process. 209

1. Short-term suspensions
Several court decisions rendered subsequent to Goss provide some direction in answering what type of notice is required in short-term suspensions. In one, a junior high school
student had been involved in four fights at school over a period
of two months. The student argued that he had received notice
from an assistant principal that he would be suspended only
for a single fight, but on the facts, a three-day suspension was
rendered by the principal who considered evidence of each fight
and based the decision to suspend on the cumulative of effect
all four incidents. 210 On appeal, the school superintendent upheld the principal's decision. On review, the Nebraska Supreme

203.
Gonzales v. McEuen, 43fi F. Supp. 460, 46fi (C.D. Cal. 1977); see also, Pittsburgh Bd. of Public Educ., fi24 A.2d 13R5, 13R9 (Pa. Commw. 19R7) (commingling
of duties by attorneys in same law firm at due process hearing impermissible).
204.
!d.
20fi.
Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 4R2 F.2d 920, 927 (6th Cir. 19RR).
206.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi6fi, fi79 (1975).
!d. at fiR2.
207.
208.
!d.
209.
See supra text accompanying notes 47-fiO.
210.
Walker v. Bradley, 320 N.W.2d 900, 900-01 (Neb. 19R2).
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Court first commented that state statutes comported with the
requirements for due process set forth in Goss v. Lopez,m
and that the school had complied with statutory requirements,
including the notice requirement. 212 Specifically, the student
and his parents had received actual notice of the date, time,
place and circumstances of each prior violation. 213 The court
concluded that it was "utterly frivolous" for the student to deny
that he received due process rights under the facts and circumstances of the case. 214
In a case with a similar result, a New Jersey student alleged that prior to a hearing resulting in a 10-day suspension,
he should have been advised that he was also in jeopardy of
being suspended from athletics for 60 days.:m The Third Circuit rejected the argument because student handbooks and
other materials available to the student, combined with common sense, should have warned the student of potential suspension from activities for misbehavior. 216
In West Virginia, an eighth-grade student, suspended for
three days for accumulating ten demerits, 217 argued that she
should have been given notice that on appeal, the school board
would use its own standard to determine whether the suspension should be upheld rather than the standard applied at an
earlier review by the teacher-student appeals council. 218 The
court found that previously published board regulations, whether actually seen by the student and her parents or not, and the
fact that the student was orally advised at the board hearing of
the standards to be applied, constituted adequate compliance
with the Goss decision's notice requirements. 219
In another decision involving the adequacy of notice, several high school students argued that the information regarding
suspension procedures included in the high school student
handbook did not detail the specific steps that would be taken
to effectuate the notice-hearing process. 220 The court held
211.
ld. at 902.
ld.
212.
213.
ld.
214.
ld.
215.
Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1989).
ld.
216.
217.
E.f!., not being prepared for class.
218.
Kirtley v. Armentrout, 405 F. Supp. 575, fi76-77 (W.D. Va. 197fi).
ld. at fi77 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 56fi, fi82 (197fi)). The court com219.
mented that the student easily could have obtained the school board regulations
which included the appeal standard.
220.
White v. Salisbury Township Sch. Dist., fi88 F. Supp. 608, 614 (E.D. Pa.
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that there are no constitutional provisions that require a school
district to publish specific procedural safeguards that closely
regulate what takes place at hearings. 221 If a state requires
specificity through the regulatory process, any failure to comply
would violate only state law. 222 Several courts have rejected
parents' arguments that they are entitled to notice before their
children are given short-term suspensions. 22a

2. Long-term suspensions or expulsions
The Supreme Court in Goss did not address long-term
suspensions or expulsions other than to suggest that "more
formal procedures" than those stipulated in its ruling on shortterm suspensions may be required. 224 In 1961, the Fifth Circuit had addressed the specific requirements of due process for
college students facing expulsion or long-term suspension. 225
That decision was subsequently considered a "landmark decision" by the Court in Goss v. Lopez. 226 The Fifth Circuit held
that before a student can be expelled from a public college for
misconduct, the student must receive notice and an opportunity
for a hearing. 227 The court specified that notice to the student
must be in writing and include a statement of the charges
specific enough to allow the student to prepare a defense. 228
A subsequent ruling on the issue by a federal district court in
Alabama found that students do not have to be found guilty of
all the charges contained in a notice in order to be subjected to
discipline. 229 If only one of the charges in the notice is proved
on the record, the student may be disciplined. 230
Although the Fifth Circuit's decision pertained to expulsion
of college students, a number of courts have followed that ruling in applying due process to high school students. A Texas
federal district court in 1981 commented, in its consideration of
19R4).
221.
ld.
222.
ld.
223.
E.g., Boster v. Philpot, 64fi F. Supp. 79R, R07-08 (D. Kan. 19R6); Boynton v.
Casey, fi43 F. Supp. 99fi (D. Me. 19R2).
224.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. fi65, 5R4 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
22fi.
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 86R U.S. 9::10 (1961).
226.
419 U.S. fi6fi, fi76 (197fi).
227.
Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158.
228.
ld. at lfiR-159.
229.
Scott v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 168, 166 (M.D. Ala.
1969).
ld. at 167.
280.
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due process requirements for an eighth-grade student who had
received a long-term suspension, that the same concepts, including written notice specifying the charges, were to be applied to all students facing lengthy suspensions from public
high schools. 231
In another decision, a high school student who had been
expelled for gross misconduct, disobedience, and disrespece32
argued on appeal that various aspects of the notice requirement were inadequate. 233 The Supreme Court of Illinois held
that two days' notice was adequate time for preparation for the
expulsion hearing and notice that the hearing issues involved a
pattern of misbehavior without giving details was adequate
since school officials had previously informed the parents of
each instance of misconduct. 234
A written notice may not be required in some circumstances. The Supreme Court of Vermont concluded in the case of a
long-term suspension or expulsion that it is not constitutionally
required that a student receive written notice even when such
notice was required by the school's own regulations. 235 On the
facts of the decision, a high school student had admitted to
school officials both on the date of the incident and at a subsequent hearing, that he had sold marijuana to another student.236 Relying on the concept that procedural due process is
flexible, the court determined that because the boy had not
been prejudiced or treated unfairly, and that both the student
and his father had been provided actual notice of the charges,
written notice was not required. 237
A decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit involved a high school student who had been
suspended initially for 10 days until such time that an expulsion hearing could be held on a charge of his bringing a gun to
school. At the hearing, held after the student had missed three
months of school, the boy was suspended for the next school
year. 238 The Second Circuit ruled that the student was not
231.
Diggles v. Corsicana Indep. Sch. Dist., 529 F. Supp. 169, 172, 173 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) (holding the student had received adequate notice).
232.
Stratton v. Wenona Unif. Dist. No. 1, 526 N.E.2d 201, 2m (III.App. 3 Dist.
1988), rev'd, 551 N.E.2d 640 (Ill. 1990).
233.
Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit Dist. No. 1, 551 N.E.2d 640, 641 (Ill.
1990).
234.
ld. at 648-49.
235.
Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Comm., 457 A.2d 1368, 187:1 (Vt. 1988).
236.
!d. at 1369-70.
237.
ld. at 1372-73.
238.
Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435, 439 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496

1]

WHAT PROCESS IS DUE

31

entitled to receive notice from the school that the time he was
absent from school during the continuances would not be considered "time served."239 The court held that due process does
not require that school officials provide, as a part of required
notice, a detailed listing of all possible discipline that might be
imposed. 240
A middle-school student, who was expelled for admitted
possession of marijuana, was found not to have been denied
due process or prejudiced even though he had not been provided, as a part of the notice requirement, a copy of the school's
code of conduct outlining all of his rights. The student had,
however, subsequently availed himself of the hearing procedures provided by the school board. 241 The court commented
that even though the student did not receive a copy of the entire code, he had not been prejudiced. This was especially true
because he had recourse to three additional opportunities to
present his case before the school board and the State Board of
Education. 242 In another decision involving the lack of formal
written hearing guidelines, a high school student, expelled from
school for possession of marijuana, was found not to have been
denied procedural due process. 243 The court reasoned that actual notice was adequate, and the student's legal counsel had
full opportunity to present testimony, offer evidence, and ask
questions at the school board hearing. 244
A Pennsylvania federal district court found that a high
school student who received a thirty day disciplinary suspension was afforded due process when he was given almost three
weeks notice of the charges prior to a scheduled board hearing
even though he had not been given notice of each specific
charge nor given notice of the specific school regulations under
which he would be punished. 245 The court concluded that a
general but clearly stated notice of the charges was adequate
because it was sufficient notice to enable the student to prepare
a defense. 246 In another decision, a high school student who

u.s. 941 (1990).
!d. at 436.
239.
!d.
240.
241.
Rucker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 517 A.2d 703, 705 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
!d.
242.
243.
M. v. Bd. of Educ. Ball-Chatham Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 5, 429 F.
Supp. 288, 291 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
!d.
244.
245.
Alex v. Allen, 409 F. Supp. 379, 386-87 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
!d. at 387.
246.
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was initially suspended for five days and then expelled for the
balance of the school year after having the opportunity to be
heard at three different hearings before three different bodies,
was found to have received adequate notice. 247 The court applied the three-part balancing test of Eldridge and concluded
that the student was entitled to receive notice of charges adequate in detail to prepare a defense, but he was not entitled to
notice of charges "drawn with the specificity required for a
criminal trial proceeding or a list of potential witnesses and a
summary of their anticipated testimony." 248
Not all courts agree on the issue of specificity of notice. A
California federal district court has ruled that when severe
penalties, such as expulsion from school, are contemplated,
constitutional due process requires that notice must "include a
statement not only of the specific charge, but must also include
the basic rights to be afforded the student: to be represented by
counsel, to present evidence, and to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses." 249
The courts are generally consistent in finding that in order
to be adequate, a hearing notice must specify the time and
place of the hearing, even when the misconduct is admitted.250 In one decision, high school students who had admitted their misconduct to school officials were given a temporary
suspension, in compliance with the requirements of Goss. 251
However, when school officials allowed the suspension to extend indefinitely, it became, in effect, an expulsion, and the
student's due process rights were violated because a written
notice of a hearing scheduled at a reasonable time and place
had not been provided. 252
The courts are split over the issue of whether notice must
include a list of potential witnesses and a summary of their
likely testimony. The Fifth Circuit, citing a number of cases
previously decided between 1961 and 1975, has ruled that
providing a list of witnesses who are adverse to the student
and a summary of their intended testimony has usually been
held to be essential with regard to long-term suspensions. 253

247.
Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 720 (W.D. La. 1978).
248.
!d. at 721.
249.
GDnzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
250.
E.g., Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744, 746 (1975); remanded, sub. nom,
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
251.
Darby v. Schoo, 544 F. Supp. 428, 430-31 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
252.
!d. at 488.
253.
Keough v. Tate County Bd. of Educ., 748 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (5th Cir.
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However, the court added that the process due is dependent
upon the totality of the circumstances and engaged in a balancing of the factors involved. 254 It held that providing a list of
witnesses prior to a hearing is not required when an analysis
of the relevant facts showed that the student was not materially prejudiced at the hearing. 255 A similar result occurred in a
Louisiana federal district court. 256 The Supreme Court of Mississippi, however, came to a contrary conclusion. 257 It determined that procedural due process was violated when school
officials refused to provide the requested lists of names of witnesses as provided in school rules designed to protect the constitutional rights of the students. 258

E. What Kind of Hearing is Required?
An essential requirement of procedural due process is the
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. Due process is
not a technical concept with fixed elements. 259 It is, by its
very nature, a highly flexible legal concept. As a concept, due
process attempts to balance the government's responsibility to
provide procedural due process with the particular life, liberty,
or property interest of the person involved.
The federal district court in Nebraska explained the flexibility of due process in a pre-Goss ruling. 260 The court said
that the requirements of due process vary with each situation
because they involve a balancing test wherein a person's right,
such as school attendance, is weighed against the government's
authority, such as maintaining discipline in the schools. The
court concluded that as the importance of a person's right increases, the government must provide a correspondingly in-

1984).
254.
!d.
255.
!d. at 1082. In Nash v. Auburn Univ., 1112 F.2d 655, 66a (11th Cir. 19117),
the court concluded that two veterinary medicine students who had been suspended
for cheating on an anatomy examination were "in this academic disciplinary process . . . not constitutionally entitled to advance notice of statements by witnesses
who, along with the appellants [students who were alleged to have cheated on the
examination], were to appear at the hearing."
256.
Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 721 (W.D. La. 19711).
257.
Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 500 So.2d 455 (Miss. 1986).
!d. at 460-61.
258.
259.
E.g., McLain v. Lafayette County Bd. of Educ., 673 F.2d 106, 110 (.5th Cir.
19112); White v. Salisbury Township Sch. Dist., 5118 F. Supp. 6011, 613 (E.D. Pa.
1984).
Graham v. Knutzen, 362 F. Supp. 881 (D. Neb. 19n!).
260.
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creasing amount of procedural due process. 261
Procedural due process does not speak to the merits or wisdom of a decision. It is intended only to help protect individuals
from mistakes made by government officials. 262 A number of
courts have stated that the burden of providing due process is
on the schools and that students are not responsible for requesting it. 263

1. Admission of misconduct
In a pre-Goss decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a high
school student who admitted that he had assaulted another
student was not entitled to a due process hearing on the
grounds that he had admitted all the important facts that a
due process hearing was supposed to establish. 264 Thus, the
fact that the student had not been allowed to have representation by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses or to present witness in his own behalf were not violations of his right to due
process. 265 In a more recent decision, a Maine student's allegation that he was denied cross-examination during an expulsion hearing was rejected on the ground he had confessed his
guilt to an administrator. 266 Upon admission of misconduct,
another high school student, who had been immediately given a
three-day in-school suspension and additional school restrictions,267 was found not to be entitled to notice or hearing. 268
In 1980, another federal district court concluded that an infor261.
Id. at 883.
262.
Carey v. Piphus, 4:35 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
E.g. Gonzales V. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 469 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Fielder
263.
v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. Neb. 1972).
264.
Black Coalition v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
1973).
265.
!d.
266.
Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 920 (D. Me.
1990); see also McLain v. LaFayette County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.
1982), reh'g denied, 673 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1982) (inadequate notice of issues to be
addressed at the hearing were not prejudicial as a result of the student's confession).
267.
Fentnn v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 769 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
268.
!d. at 771-72. The parent did in fact receive written notice but not the
student. The incident occurred off campus in the evening when the student, while
sitting in a car, noticed his teacher drive by, and proceeded to call him "a prick."
At this hearing the teacher, who was the recipient of the unwanted remark, was
not present and hence the student was denied the opportunity of cross-examination. Further the student was not allowed to present his own witnesses. The court
concluded that since the student had admitted to the offensive remark he had not
been denied due process even though the above mentioned procedural safeguards
were not afforded.

1

l

I

1]

\

mal hearing is not necessary regarding suspension or expulsion
when a student admits his culpability. 269
Students who had admitted vandalizing school property
and were then suspended for three days 270 were held to have
received due process. 271 Relying on Goss, 272 the district
court concluded that once guilt is admitted, there is no need for
students to present their versions of what had happened. 273
Critical to this decision was the Goss requirement that students must be given an explanation of the evidence and an
opportunity to present their version of the situation if they
deny the charges. 274 The inference the court obtained was
that if a student does not deny the charges, then neither an
explanation of evidence by the school or an opportunity to be
heard is required.
A high school student who was wearing sunglasses in
school, a violation of school rules, was given a one-day suspension and time in detention because she refused to remove her
glasses and give them to the teacher. 275 The student admitted
that she refused to obey the teacher's command. 276 The court
concluded that "when a student admits to the conduct [refusal
to tum over glasses] giving rise to the suspension, the need for
a due process hearing is obviated, since the purpose of a hearing is to safeguard against punishment of students who are
innocent of the accusations against them."277 A number of additional cases support the contention that admission of guilt
does not require any prior hearing. 278
Only one court ruling has been found taking the opposite

\
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Montoya v. Sanger Unified Sch. Dist., 502 F. Supp. 209, 213 (E.D. Cal.
269.
19HO).
270.
Boster v. Philpot, 64fi F. Supp. 798, 800 (D. Kan. 1986).
271.
ld. at 804.
272.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 56fi, fiH1 (197fi).
273.
Boster, 64fi F. Supp. at 805.
274.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.
Cole v. Newton Special Mun. Sch. Dist., 676 F. Supp. 749, 7fi2 (S.D. Miss.
27fi.
19H7).
276.
ld.
277.
Id. The court relied on Black Coalition v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1, 484
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1973) and Montoya v. Sanger Unified Sch. Dist., 502 F.
Supp. 209, 213 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
27H.
E.g., Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. 812, 81fi (D.W.V. 1977); Long v.
Thornton Township High Sch. Dist., fi2 F.R.D. 186 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Coffman v.
Kuehler, 409 F. Supp. fi46, fi50 (N.D. Tex., 1976); Abremski v. Southeastern Sch.
Dist., 421 A.2d 485, 487 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980); Birdsey v. Grand Blanc Community Sch., 344 N.W. 2d 342, 346 (Mich. App. 1983); Greenspan v. Antin, 423
N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (1979), affd 433 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. 1980).
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view. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that students have the right to present their
views of the misconduct at a hearing, even when they admit
the offense. 279 The Eighth Circuit relied on the then recent
Goss statement that "things are not always as they seem to be,
and the student will at least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context."280
A fair reading of Goss might require that a hearing be held
in some circumstances regardless of admission of guilt or school
official observation of misconduct by the student. Those situations would exist when the student does not deny his or her
action, but may have a justifiable or mitigating reason for the
misconduct. Such might be the situation, for example, when a
student is observed hitting another student, but can claim that
he or she was struck by the other student first.

2. Short-term suspensions
For short-term suspensions the Supreme Court in Goss
stated that a student must be afforded at least a rudimentary
hearing. 281 The Court clearly indicated that it did not want to
unduly burden public education by imposing elaborate detailed
due process elements in each situation. 282 In fact, the Court
indicated that the hearing need only be "an informal give-andtake discussion between the student and the disciplinarian."283 These rudimentary hearings will typically occur immediately following the misconduct, but prior to suspension. The
Court acknowledged, however, that emergency situations may
occur that will force a hearing to follow a suspension after a
reasonable amount of time. 284
The rudimentary hearing is intended to provide the school

279.
Strickland v. Inlow, fi19 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 197fi). Three female tenth
grade students admitted that they had spiked the punch at an extracurricular
function in violation of school regulations.
ld. (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at fi84). The Court in Goss acknowledged that
280.
"[r]equiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take between student and
disciplinarian, preferably prior to the suspension, will add little to the factfinding
function where the disciplinarian himself has witnessed the conduct forming the
basis for the charge. But things are not always as they seem to be . . . "
Goss, 419 U.S. at fi79.
281.
282.
ld. at fi80.
283.
ld. at 584.
ld. at fi82. Under certain emergency circumstances a student may be imme284.
diately removed from school. A "hearing should follow as soon as practicable." Id.
at fi82-583.
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official with an opportunity to inform the student of alleged
misconduct and to give the student an opportunity to explain
his or her version of the situation. 285 Additional procedural
safeguards beyond notice and a rudimentary hearing286 were
not required, although the Court noted that school officials had
discretion to afford additional procedures if the situation warranted.287 The court noted that a school official might find it
necessary to "summon the accuser, permit cross examination, . . . allow the student to present his own
witnesses .... [and even] permit counsel" in an effort to avoid
error. 288
The general due process requirement that the hearing
"must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner"289 appears to be totally at the discretion of school
officials. In Goss, the Court assumed that the school official
would usually conduct the hearing immediately after providing
notice. 290 Allowing the student a delay between notice and
hearing would, the Court feared, unduly formalize the adversarial nature of the proceeding. 291 The Court reasoned
that delay would be too costly and destructive to the educational process. 292 The ruling in Goss was an obvious effort to
strike a balance between school officials possibly making a
mistake in erroneously suspending a student and the added
burden of a full due process hearing to administration of public
schools.
In a ruling subsequent to Goss, a federal district court in
Illinois had before it a situation involving a boy who had been
suspended for 10 days for possession of a knife in school. 293
The principal met informally with the boy and discussed the
situation before imposing the suspension. The boy's parents
requested and received a hearing before the local board and the
board upheld the suspension. 294 The parents' suit alleged violation of procedural due process on the grounds that their son

285.
!d. at 580-81.
286.
Goss, v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 582.
287.
!d. at 583-584.
288.
!d.
289.
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
290.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 582.
291.
!d. at 58::1.
292.
!d.
293.
Reineman v. Valley View Community Sch. Dist. No. ::l6fi-U, 527 F. Supp.
661, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
294.
!d.
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had not been allowed to confront or cross-examine witnesses
against him and had not been allowed to make a verbatim
recording of the hearings. 295 The court noted that the Goss
decision had expressly declined to require full-scale hearings
for short-tenn suspensions and required no more than rudimentary hearings such as those provided by the principal and
board. The court found that appropriate due process had been
afforded the boy through "a mere informal encounter between
the student and disciplinary authority.'>2 96
The federal district court in Maine was faced with the
suspension and subsequent expulsion of a student for use of
marijuana on school property. 297 The student's parents alleged their son's due process rights had been violated because
the principal denied him pennission to leave school during the
time he was being questioned by the principal. Moreover, the
parents alleged that the student was not infonned of his right
to remain silent, was not notified that he could have his parents present during questioning and his parents were not notified at the time of the questioning. 298 The court found no legal basis in the parents' allegations and upheld the procedures
used by the principal in the suspension. 299

3. What "unusual situations" call for more than rudimentary
procedures?
The Sixth Circuit addressed the meaning of "unusual situations," referred to in Goss, 300 that would call for more than
rudimentary due process procedures for short-term suspensions.301 In the decision, an eighth-grade student was suspended for 10 days for possession of a drug look-alike. The
student's parents argued that the drug-associated charge was
stigmatizing and had a hannful effect on a student's reputation,302 and that therefore the Mathews v. Eldridge 303 balancing test should be applied instead of Goss' rudimentary
requirements of notice and hearing. The court concluded that

295.
ld. at 665.
ld; see also Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1987) (find296.
ing that an informal discussion of charges was adequate for seven-day suspension).
297.
Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 996 (D. Me. 1982).
ld. at 997.
298.
ld. at 998.
299.
300.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
Paredes v. Curtis, 864 F.2d 426, 427 (6th Cir. 1988).
301.
302.
ld. at 428.
303.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975).
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the case did not present an unusual situation but was precisely
the type of school situation the Goss standard was meant to address.304
A seventh-grade student who refused to attend a required
physical education class was suspended from school until such
time as she would participate in the class. 305 Various meetings of school officials and school board members were held
with the father and daughter without resolution. 306 By the
time the action was filed in federal district court, the student
had missed about six weeks of school due to the indefinite
suspension and the student's voluntary non-attendance. 307
The court noted that school officials were confronted with a
disciplinary problem and not a truancy problem; the student
had been only suspended and not expelled from school. 308 The
court held that proper notice and hearing had been afforded the
father and daughter at an initial hearing and that the extenuating circumstances of the voluntary non-attendance did not
change that result. 309
In a situation arising in Texas, a junior high school student who had been adjudicated a delinquent was ordered to
attend school, but was subsequently suspended from school for
various forms of misconduct. 310 A modification hearing on his
delinquency was held within four weeks of the suspension, and
the student argued that the modification order committing him
to the state detention school should be rescinded because he
had been denied due process in his suspension from schooP 11
Though the student's suspension from school had exceeded ten
days at the time of the modification hearing, the court noted
that the student would have been readmitted to school earlier
if his mother would have requested a conference with school
teachers and officials. 312 The court concluded that the evidence did not establish that the student was absent longer
than ten days from school by other than his own choice. 313
304.
!d. at 429. The court continued: "Therefore, we decline the invitation to apply the Mathews balancing test and instead will apply the Goss standard in resolving both of Paredes' procedural due process contentions."
305.
Ouimette v. Babbie, 405 F. Supp. 525, 526 (D. Vt. 197fi).
306.
!d. at 526-28.
307.
!d.
308.
!d. at fi28.
309.
!d. at fi29.
310.
In the Matter of J.L.D., 536 S.W.2d 68fi, 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
311.
!d.
312.
!d. at 687.
313.
!d. at 688.
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The court found therefore that no additional due process was
required and that school officials had met the minimal notice
and hearing requirements specified in Goss for short-term suspensions.314
The Fifth Circuit reviewed a decision involving a suspension during the time of scheduled final examinations. In Keough v. Tate County Board of Education, the Fifth Circuit noted
that no distinction was made in Goss between suspensions
occurring during examination periods and those occurring at
other times. 315 The court concluded that although final examinations are important to a student's grade and have a longterm effect on a student's life, they are not materially different
from examinations that take place throughout the semester.316 To exclude final examination periods from the ruling in
Goss and requiring more formal proceedings would significantly
undermine its meaning. 317
In another decision, a high school senior who admitted he
had consumed whiskey while attending a school outing was
suspended for three days. 318 The suspensions happened to coincide with examinations. 319 As a result, the student failed
three courses and did not graduate. 320 The student argued before the Seventh Circuit that he was in effect expelled rather
than suspended and claimed that he was entitled to procedural
due process in addition to that required in Goss. 321 The Seventh Circuit was in agreement with the Fifth Circuit's discussion above 322 and concluded that the student received legally
required process due. 323 The court noted that the student
would have graduated without taking final examinations if his
grades had been high enough and concluded that the action
taken was not really an expulsion despite the long-term and
harsh effects of the timing of his misconduct. 324 In a state
court decision, a student who was suspended from school for

314.
!d.
315.
748 F.2d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 1984).
ld.
316.
317.
ld. The court noted that the student was eventually allowed to take his
final examinations.
318.
Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 527
(7th Cir. 1987).
ld.
319.
320.
ld.
321.
ld. at 529.
322.
See supra text accompanying notes 315-17.
323.
Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529.
324.
!d.
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three days, and consequently missed an important test, needed
only be afforded rudimentary due process. 325
A high school student who received both a ten-day academic suspension and a 60-day athletic suspension was held not to
be entitled to any more procedural safeguards than that required for only a 10-day suspension. 326 The Third Circuit
found that the student was not entitled to a second notice and
hearing for the athletic suspension, even though he had not
been advised in the initial notice or hearing that he might be
subject to suspension from athletics as an additional penalty
for his misconduct. The court ruled that Goss requires only
notice of alleged misconduct and its evidentiary basis, but does
not require that a statement of all potential penalties be included.327
The Third Circuit also held that the student was not entitled to additional due process even though he faced the cumulative effect of both an academic and an athletic suspension. ~
The court applied the Eldridge balancing test and concluded
that requiring different types of due process - one for athletes
and another for all other students -would be unduly disruptive. 329 The minimal due process procedures required by Goss
were found to be sufficient under the circumstances. 330
To date, courts have not identified any "unusual situations"
calling for procedural safeguards in addition to those minimally
required in Goss. 331 The unusual situation would seem to require that a student suffer a severe penalty not reasonably
contemplated by a ten day suspension or restrictions on extracurricular activities. Such an unusual situation it might be
conjectured, could involve a student being denied a scholarship
award or admission to a college or military academy as a result
of a notation of discipline on a student's record.
3 8

4. Expulsions and long-term suspensions
In Goss, the Supreme Court did not expressly state what
additional safeguards would be afforded students who are sub-

325.
1991).
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Wayne County Bd. of Educ. v. Tyre, 404 S.E.2d 809, 810-11 (Ga. Ct. App.
Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1989).
ld. at 96 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975)).
ld. at 95.
ld. at 96.
ld. at 95.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
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ject to suspensions longer than ten days or to expulsions. The
majority of the Court merely indicated that "more formal procedures" may be required. 332 Recently, the federal district court
in Maine, after considering the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing
test, reiterated its list of minimum procedural safeguards to be
used when student disciplinary hearings are conducted. 333
Those requirements are:
(1) The student must be advised of the charges against him;
(2) the student must be informed of the nature of the evidence
against him;
(3) the student must be given an opportunity to be heard in
his own defense;
(4) the student must not be punished except on the basis of
substantial evidence;
(5) the student must be permitted the assistance of a lawyer
in major disciplinary hearings;
(6) the student must be permitted to confront and to crossexamine the witnesses against him;
(7) the student has the right to an impartial tribunal. 334

Providing perhaps a startling contrast to this list of minimum requirements is a recent Sixth Circuit's opinion wherein
the court held that due process does not require that a student
be allowed to cross-examine or even know the identities of students who accused him of selling marijuana, to cross-examine
school officials, or to attend closed deliberations held by the
school board even though prosecuting school officials were present.335 The Sixth Circuit also relied on the Mathews v.
Eldridge test, which was characterized as providing for a "flexible, policy-oriented analysis of procedural due process issues."336
Granted, as outlined previously, that notice and hearing
are required, the question remains what other procedural due
process safeguards are constitutionally required in order to
ensure a fair hearing with respect to expulsions or suspensions

332.
!d.
333.
Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 918-19 (D. Me.
1990).
334.
!d. at 919 (quoting Keene v. Rodgers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. Me. 1970)).
The court in footnote 7 added: "Although the Court spoke on this issue prior to
the landmark Supreme Court precedents governing this subject, the Court's decision is consistent with those precedents and, therefore, retains its vitality."
335.
Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 924 (6th Cir. 1988).
336.
!d.
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longer than ten days.

a. The right of confrontation and cross-examination
The United States Suprem,3 Court in Goss all but eliminated the right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses for short-term suspensions, with the possible exception that
an "unusual situation" may require something more than minimal due process procedures. 337 The Court was silent regarding the process required for longer suspensions or expulsions, 338 and it has been the lower federal courts that have
attempted to determine the law on this point.
At least one federal district court, relying on the Goss decision, offered students facing expulsion a complete panoply of
procedural safeguards, including the right of confrontation and
cross-examination of adverse witnesses. 339 The court inferred
from Goss that the rights to have counsel present and to confront and cross-examine witnesses were required because of the
severe nature of the penalty of expulsion, 340 especially when
heresay evidence was involved. 341 In 1990, the federal district
court in Maine, after considering the three-factor balancing test
of Mathews v. Eldridge, included among its minimum procedural safeguards for expulsion, the right of a student to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses presented against him at the
hearing. 342 However, because the student admitted the
charge of bringing an automatic weapon to school, the lack of
cross-examination had no bearing on the decision. 343
In a case before the Eighth Circuit, a school board had
refused to allow a student being considered for expulsion to
cross-examine the teacher who had brought two charges
against him. 344 The district court had balanced the competing
interests of effective school administration with the protection

:~37.

Goss, 419 U.S. at fi83-84 (indicating that a school official could "permit
cross-examination, and allow the student to present his own witnesses" if the
school official chose such action).
!d.
338.
339.
Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 467 (C.D. Cal 1977).
!d.
340.
341.
!d. at 469.
Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 7fi4 F. Supp. 906, 918-19 (D. Me.
342.
1990).
!d. at 920; see supm text accompanying notes 263-279.
34a.
344.
Dillon v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., fi94 F.2d 699, 700 (8th Cir.
1979) (the charges were public display of affection on school grounds, and failure to
comply with reasonable commands of teachers).
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of the student's entitlement to an education under state law
and concluded that even expulsion proceedings could have some
limits on confrontation, such as anonymity for student accusers
who might be the victim of reprisals. 345 However, as in the
instant case, when a teacher brought the charges and was
present at the hearing, the minor loss of time for her testimony
and cross-examination did not weigh heavily against the student's loss of an education. The court therefore ruled that the
student should have been allowed to cross-examine the teacher.346 The ruling was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, and one
judge, in a concurring opinion, stated that the rationale of Goss
required that the student be allowed to cross-examine the teacher as to the facts of the situation. 347
A number of court decisions are in agreement, partially because of state statutory or local rule requirements based on
constitutional concepts. In a decision involving a student who
lost a semester's academic credit because she had a few sips of
beer in her home before school on the last day of a school
term, 348 the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the school
board's decision because the school had not complied with its
own rules which required the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against students charged with misconduct. 349
Several other courts have ruled that schools must provide
the right to cross-examine students where state statutes have
established that right. One state court has ruled that a school
board is required to examine the evidence and not merely rely
on school officials' reports when evidence is conflicting and
when it has not been shown that available witnesses are at
risk of being harmed if they testify. 350 The court added that it
would be appropriate for the board to rely on hearsay reports
only when it is established that the disclosure of the witness'
identity would subject the witness to retaliation. 351 The court

345.
Dillon v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 468 F. Supp fi4, fi8 (E.D. Ark.
1978).
ld.
346.
347.
Dillon, 594 F.2d at 700-01 (Benson, Chief Dist. J., concurring).
Warran County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, fiOO So.2d 4fifi, 4fi6 (Miss. 1986);
348.
contra Jones v. Pascaqoula Mun. Sep. Sch. Dist., fi24 So.2d 968, 973 (Miss. 1988)
(noting that the issue of testimony from school employees may be treated differently).
ld. at 460-61.
349.
350.
John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist, 6fi4 P.2d 242, 246-47
(Cal. 1983).
ld. at 246. The court referenced Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 417, 482
351.
(1972) (stating that with regard to a parole violation hearing, a hearing officer may
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apparently would require that there be an express finding of
risk before witnesses would be considered unavailable. 352 A
similar result was reached in Florida when a state appeals
court held that a high school student could not be expelled
based exclusively on hearsay evidence. 353 State statute required that hearsay evidence could be used only to substantiate
other evidence and could not be the exclusive evidence presented.
Some courts have reached contrary results on the right of
cross-examination. One federal district court, after balancing
the Mathews v. Eldridge factors, concluded contrary to some of
the above rulings, that the burden and cost to school officials
outweighed any risk of error. The court held that the school
board was not required to conduct full-scale hearings with
cross-examination and provision of a list of witnesses with a
summary of their testimony and discovery prior to expelling
students for the remainder of the school year. 354 With regard
to the "guilt phase of suspension hearings,"355 the Fifth Circuit has declined to formalize the suspension process by requiring school administrators to establish a basis in fact as to the
accuracy of each piece of evidence considered at a hearing. 356
Written statements of three unidentified students implicating
the charged student with use and sale of drugs at school that
were read at the hearing were sufficiently specific regarding
the student's use of and dealing in drugs and thus constituted
a sufficient form of confrontation. 357
A similar result was found in a decision of the Sixth Circuit involving a high school student accused of possession and
sale of a marijuana cigarette. 358 At a hearing before the
school board, the student was denied permission to learn the
names of and cross-examine student accusers or to cross-examine the principal and superintendent359 who had conducted
the investigation, imposed sanctions, and relayed their results

determine that if "the informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his identity
were disclosed, he need not be subjected to confrontation and cross-examination").
~152.
lei. at 24 7.
:153.
Franklin v. Dist. Sch. Bd. of Hendry County, :156 So. 2d 9:31, 9:12 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
354.
Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 720-21 (W.D. La. 1976).
355.
Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 261-63 (5th Cir. 1985).
356.
Id. at 263.
357.
Id.
358.
Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 921 (6th Cir. 1988).
359.
Id. at 922.
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of the investigation to the board. 360 The court was satisfied
that the superintendent and principal used only reliable information provided by the informants in their earlier administrative decision to expel the student. 361
In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit applied the Mathews test and determined that allowing the accused student to
know and cross-examine his student accusers was outweighed
by the necessity of protecting student witnesses from reprisal.362 The need to protect the school environment against the
increasingly serious problem of drug use and violent crime, 363
coupled with the need to protect student-informants from reprisal, was determined essential in order to protect students who
are willing to report offenses by their fellow students. 364 The
value of the additional procedural safeguard- an opportunity
to confront and cross-examine student-informants - was not
found to be sufficiently compelling because school officials
would be able to evaluate the veracity of incriminating statements provided by other students. 365
The Sixth Circuit assumed that cross-examination of the
student witness would duplicate the original assessment undertaken by the investigating school administrator. 366 With
regard to cross-examination of the school administrators, the
court concluded that allowing their cross-examination was too
heavy a burden when weighed against the small benefit the
student would receive. 367 Also, in applying the Mathews balancing test, the court recognized that allowing cross-examination of school administrators would interfere with their normal
duties as they worked to become familiar with legal principles
involving cross-examination. 368 The court reasoned that
school board members should not be diverted from their prima-

360.
!d. at 921. The principal recommended a ten-day suspension and the superintendent expelled the student for the balance of the fall semester.
361.
!d. at 921-22.
362.
!d. at 925. The Sixth Circuit also reached the same conclusion in Paredes
v. Curtis, 864 F.2d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that the student-plaintiff who
had been suspended for ten days did not have the right of cross-examination of the
student-informant when such right was denied in Newsome, H42 F.2d at 925, which
was an expulsion case).
363.
!d., (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) which, in turn,
cited a 197R report to the U.S. Congress).
364.
!d.
365.
!d.
366.
!d.
367.
!d. at 925.
36R.
!d. at 925-26.
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ry goal of educating young people to assume a new responsibility of a "quasi judicial" body and perform a role they are not
well equipped to perform. 369 The court clearly stated that
school boards should not have to follow all the formal rules of
evidence in hearings. 370
A Wisconsin state appellate court has taken a similar position of balancing and has held that allowing hearsay statements of students not present at the hearing and not subject to
cross-examination did not violate a student's right to due process. 371 The court stated that a school board made up of nonattorneys should not be expected to follow the requirements of
the hearsay rule. 372 In the absence of a showing that the teacher witnesses had reason to lie, hearsay statements should be
allowed, at least in part, to serve as the basis for the board
decision. 373

b. When is counsel required?
Rudimentary hearings for short-term suspensions, absent
an unusual situation, do not require schools to allow the student to secure legal counsel. 374 However, such procedures
may be required for expulsions or suspensions longer than ten
days 375 though the Supreme Court declined to expressly elaborate. The Third Circuit has held that only minimal due process was required where a student was suspended for 10 days
and also received a 60-day athletic suspension. 376 The court
specifically declined to require the right to counsel. 377 Recently, the federal district court in Maine stated that students must
be allowed legal assistance in major disciplinary hearings, but
noted that in the situation before it that the student had been
not denied that opportunity. 378 A federal district court in Pennsylvania ruled that there is no right to an attorney or a right

369.
ld.
370.
ld. at 926, (citing Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 492 F.2d 697, 701 (5th
Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1974)).
371.
Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Thompson, 331 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Wis. Ct. App.
1982).
ld. at 337-38.
372.
373.
!d. at 338.
374.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975).
375.
ld. at 584.
376.
Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1989).
377.
!d.
378.
Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 919 (D. Me.
1990).
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to an attorney at school expense in a situation involving an
involuntary transfer of a student between attendance centers
for disciplinary reasons. 379
In general, most courts reviewing student due process
issues since Goss have not needed to address the right to counsel. The schools had allowed or encouraged legal representation
when long-term suspension or expulsion were involved. 380
c. Other due process elements

The foregoing discussion of procedural due process elements represents those which are commonly at issue in court
reviews of procedural due process. However, there are several
other issues that arise on a less frequent basis.
Inherent in the requirements of notice and an opportunity
to respond is the requirement that decisions be based only on
the evidence produced at the hearing. In an important case
before the Sixth Circuit, a school board decision to expel a
student was reversed because the superintendent revealed new
evidence during board deliberations after the hearing was concluded.381 The court concluded that such an action deprived
the student of his required opportunity to rebut the evidence.382 It was discovered that the superintendent had given
false information to the board. 383

379.
Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397, 401-02 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
380.
Allegations of denial of procedural due process involving expulsion typically
have had representation by counsel or were afforded the opportunity to be represented by counsel. For example, in John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch.
Dist., 64fi P.2d 242, 244 (Cal. 1983), school officials, when informing parents of the
scheduled hearing also advised them that they be represented hy counsel. In
Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., R42 F.2d 920, 921 (6th Cir. 19RR), the student was represented by counsel at a hearing before the school board. Other decisions wherein there was representation by counsel include: Dillon v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 46R F. Supp. fi4, 56 (E.D. Ark. 197H); Draper v. Columbus
Pub. Sch., 760 F. Supp. 131, 132 (S.D Ohio 1991); Jones v. Pascaqoula Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 524 So.2d 968, 969 (Miss. 19R8); Lamb v. Panhandle Community
Unif. Sch. Dist. No. 2, R26 F.2d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 19R7) (three day suspension);
Ouimette v. Babbie, 405 F. Supp. 525, fi26 (D. Vt. 197fi) (suspended until student
attends physical education class); Paredes v. Curtis, R64 F.2d 426, 42R (6th Cir.
1988) (ten day suspension); Smith v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., fiR2 F. Supp 1fi9, 160
(E.D. Ark. 1984); Sykes v. Sweeney, 638 F. Supp. 274, 27R (E.D. Mo. 19R6);
Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 721 (W.D. La. 197R).
Newsome, 842 F.2d at 927.
3Rl.
382.
ld. at 92R; see also Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 7fi4 F. Supp.
906, 919 (D. Me. 1990) (included in a list of due process rights); De Jesus v.
Penberty, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972) (a pre-Goss ruling holding that a decision must be based only on evidence introduced at hearing).
383.
ld., n. 7.
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Court decisions are divided on the issue of requiring a
written decision in long-term suspensions. One view states
written decisions require the decision maker to weigh the evidence more heavily, and in a balance of competing interests,
the student should be provided a written decision. 384 In the
other view, no reason justifying the requirement of a written
decision has been identified. 385
One court has ruled that due process does not require that
witnesses at expulsion hearings be swom to tell the truth or
that formal rules of evidence be followed. 386 The requirement
of such additional procedures would result in a significant
burden being placed on the school without providing any additional important protection against error. 387 Several courts
ruled that due process in the school setting does not require
the right to appeal a decision to a higher authority. 388 While
pre-Goss rulings were split on the issue of requiring a verbatim
record of hearings, 389 no post-Goss ruling on the issue has
been identified.

V. CURING DEFECTS IN PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Many school officials have determined after the fact that a
particular student may not have been afforded appropriate
procedural due process. Some have proceeded with a "let the
chips fall where they may" attitude, but others have taken a
constructive approach to the problem. One such approach
would involve the removal from the student's record of all mention of the previous faulty hearing and any discipline rendered,
thus placing the student in the same position he or she faced
before the faulty hearing was held. A second hearing could
then be held with procedural defects cured. While no court has
expressly ruled that such an approach is legal in the context of
384.
Takeall v. Ambach, 609 F. Supp 81, 85-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Carey v. Maine
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 920 (D. Me. 1990); see pre-Goss rulings requiring a written decision in Fielder v. Board of Educ. 346 F. Supp. 722 (D.
Neb. 1972); De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972).
381i.
Long v. Thornton Township High Sch. Dist. 201i, 82 F.R.D. 186, 192 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); see also pre-Goss ruling in Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 (7th
Cir. 1972) (holding that a written decision not required).
386.
Sykes v. Sweeney, 688 F. Supp. 274, 279 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
887.
ld.
38R.
Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 263 (lith Cir. 19Rii);
Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
E.g., Pierce v. School Committee, 822 F. Supp. 91i7 (D. Mass. 1971) (ver889.
batim record not required); Fielder v. Board of Educ. 346 F. Supp. 722 m. Neb.
1972) (verbatim record was required).
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school discipline, several courts have implicitly upheld the
curing of earlier procedural defects through subsequent hearings.
In a case before the Eighth Circuit, a local school board
had suspended three girls for three months for allegedly !Spiking the punch at a school event. 390 The board had not provided the girls or their parents with proper notice of the hearing at which the initial decision was made and held a second
hearing about two weeks later in which the notice defects were
corrected. 391 Without expressly ruling on the issue of cured
defects, the court ruled that the second hearing procedure was
faulty because the school board had distributed a written statement of its finding of facts before the second hearing had begun. Because the record did not establish that the board actually considered the discipline issue anew, the court found that
the second hearing had not, in fact, cured the procedural defects.392
In a situation before a Virginia federal district court, a
student was suspended for three days for being disrespectful
toward a teacher and using abusive language. 393 When uncertainty arose about the legality of the procedures used, the
school allowed the student to remain in school and began the
disciplinary process anew. The student was offered all required
procedures. 394 The court ruled that the initial defects did not
taint the later proceedings and the student had been afforded
proper due process. 395 A similar result occurred in a Texas
case where procedural defects in a rudimentary suspension
hearing were found to have been corrected by a second hearing
two hours later with the student's father. 396 A pre-Goss ruling
in Louisiana also upheld the use of a second hearing to cure a
procedural defect and stated that the amount of time lapse
between the first hearing and the curative hearing was not
important. 397

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 1975).
ld.
ld.
Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. 812, 814 (W.D. Va. 1977).
ld.
ld. at 815.
Coffman v. Kuehler, 409 F. Supp. 546, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
Williams v. Vermillion Parish Sch. Bd., 345 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. La. 1972).
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VI. DAMAGES FOR PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
VIOLATIONS

School officials who may have inadvertently violated the
procedural due process rights of students, even though the
discipline imposed was justified on the facts, may have only
nominal damages awarded against them. In Carey v. Piphus,
the Supreme Court reviewed a situation involving several elementary and secondary students in Illinois who had been suspended from school for 20 days without being provided appropriate procedural due process. 398 The district court had not
awarded any damages to students, because they had not shown
any specific monetary injury resulting from missing school for
20 days. However, the Seventh Circuit held that the students
were entitled to recover substantial damages regardless of
proof of actual injury. 399
The Supreme Court disagreed with both lower courts and
ruled that in the absence of proof of actual injury, students
whose procedural rights were violated, but whose suspensions
were justified on the facts, are entitled to recover only nominal
damages not to exceed one dollar. 400 The rationale for the decision was that due process was not meant to protect against
loss of protected rights, only against the mistaken or unjustified loss of life, liberty, or property. 401 Of course, if a student
can show that his or her procedural due process rights were
violated and, had the student been provided an opportunity for
a fair hearing, he or she would not have been found guilty and
punished, the student may be given an opportunity to prove
actual damages in excess of nominal damages. 402
Several subsequent court rulings have applied the concept
of awarding one dollar as nominal damages in situations involving student due process violations, where the student was
guilty of the infraction. In one decision, students had been
suspended by school administrators indefinitely without adequate due process. 403 In another, a student was awarded one
dollar in nominal damages when school officials refused to al-
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low cross-examination of a teacher at an expulsion hearing, but
the student was actually guilty of insubordinate behavior toward the teacher. 404
School officials should not be mistaken, however, in assuming that the Carey ruling will prevent considerable out-of-pocket loss for violations of student due process rights. As provided
in federal statute, if the student prevails in civil rights litigation, in addition to paying for their own legal services, school
officials may have to pay for the student's attorney. 405

VII.

SUMMARY

Whatever else procedural due process may be, it remains
little more than a process. It does not speak to the merits or
the wisdom of a decision. Its purpose is merely to aid in
achieving a proper and fair result. This is accomplished by
requiring an appropriate procedure that better enables the
decision maker to arrive at a fair and just decision.
The most important court interpretation concerning procedural due process in the context of discipline of public school
students is found in Goss v. Lopez. In that ruling, the Supreme
Court held that involuntary removal of students from public
school, even for short periods of time, involved property and
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause and thus,
school officials must provide students with at least a rudimentary hearing. They must provide students with notice of the
allegations of misconduct, and if the student denies the allegations, the student must be provided with the evidence substantiating the allegations and an opportunity to explain his or her
version of the situation. At that time, school officials may determine to investigate the matter further or they may make a
decision regarding the punishment, or lack of punishment, of
the student. School officials may provide additional due process, but none is generally required. The Court did not require
any more due process than that required by good educational
practice.
Subsequent court decisions have expanded and applied the
spirit of the Goss ruling to long-term suspensions and expulsions, but they have not generally expanded student due process rights into other areas, such as athletic participation, in-
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school suspension where access to the educational program is
allowed, and participation in school ceremonies, such as commencement. Some situations, such as loss of a semester's academic credit or exclusion from all school activities for an extended time, may have different results.
Generally a due process hearing must precede any decision
to punish a student. If an emergency situation exists, such as
the student being under the influence of drugs or acting in a
violent manner, a hearing may be held at a later time.
There is a universally accepted requirement that decisions
1rade as a result of due process hearings be made by impartial
decision makers. There is a strong legal presumption that
school officials are not biased unless the student can establish
actual bias. Mere allegations of bias do not result in improper
decision making or a violation of due process. A decision maker
is not biased merely because he or she observed the incident,
conducted an investigation, or is employed by the same school
considering the discipline of the student. If the alleged misconduct was perpetrated against the decision maker, however, bias
would more likely be present. The courts are divided on the
issue of dual roles of prosecutor and advisor to the decision
maker played by attorneys and administrators.
Removal from school for longer than 10 days or possibly a
short-term suspension coupled with other deprivations may
result in the need for additional due process to be afforded the
student. As the potential loss to the student increases, the
school requirement to provide more process generally increases.
In situations involving exclusion from school for longer
than 10 days, it is desirable to have a written notice outlining
the charges and stating the time, place, and date of the hearing. The courts are divided on the issue of providing a list of
witnesses and a summary of their proposed testimony in the
notice.
Court decisions are generally consistent in requiring students who are being considered for long-term suspension or
expulsion be given the opportunity to explain their version of
the situation in a meaningful way. That is why due process
requires little in the way of procedure if the student admits the
misconduct and the facts are not in dispute.
In addition to the requirements of notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard in situations of long-term suspension
or expulsion, some courts have stated that a student can be
punished only on the basis of evidence introduced at the hearing; must be allowed to have an attorney present; must be
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permitted to examine documents and confront and cross-examine witness, and must be allowed to have a verbatim record
made.
The courts are not consistent in their rulings on many of
the elements of due process, especially those enumerated immediately above. Those differences in court interpretation are a
result not only of different interpretations in the various jurisdictions, but also of court efforts to weigh student protected
interests against additional procedural burdens on school officials. When the facts of a specific situation are weighed in this
balance, prediction of result becomes quite difficult.
Some court decisions have indicated that recognized errors
in providing due process can be curred by starting over and
providing the proper due process in a second hearing. If the
student was guilty of an alleged infraction of school rules and
was merely deprived of an element of due process without other
loss, only nominal damages will be awarded.
School officials and their attorneys must be aware of the
law and the spirit of the Goss decision, and the precedential
value of due process decisions in their various jurisdictions.
They need to attempt to predict how a court might weigh the
facts of a specific situation in making its decision. Taking a
position of providing more due process than is minimally required gives school officials and their attorneys more latitude
in defending against law suits and provides additional benefits
to the school community.

VIII.

CoNCLUSION

Probably no other language in the Constitution has engendered more court decisions and legal discussion than the
phrase "due process of law." Yet, with all the discourse and all
the decisions, the exact meaning of the phrase remains elusive.
We know that procedural due process is a flexible concept that
results in differing requirements dependent upon differing
factual circumstances. It is challenging, if not impossible, on a
national scale to reasonably predict court application of specific
elements of procedural due process in specific factual circumstances. More than any other area of education law, procedural
due process is dependent upon the totality of the circumstances
and the court jurisdiction involved.
We also know that early fears of undue and meddlesome
court intervention into the operation of the schools as a result
of the Goss ruling has not come to pass. The courts have gen-
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erally been restrained in applying due process concepts to educational deprivations, other than exclusion, and have generally
done a good job in balancing the students' interests against the
added burdens that due process requirements might place on
schools. Mter much litigation over the nearly two decades since
Goss was decided, the courts have not greatly expanded due
process beyond minimum protections of students' property and
liberty interests.
Yet, public schools continue to be taken into court to defend their due process procedures. Much of the problem appears to be that educators spend a great deal of effort attempting
to determine what minimal due process requirements are required and then end up spending a great deal of time attempting to defend the minimum due process they provide. They
forget that while in the eyes of the law you can provide inadequate due process, you can never provide too much. If educators would become more concerned with treating students as
they themselves would like to be treated, so that when due
process minimums are not clear, an effort is made to provide
students with extra process, they will save much time, effort,
and money in the long run. While it sometimes takes a little
more time and effort to give students more process than may
be minimally due, much time and money may be saved because
mounting a legal defense to challenges will be easier. If there
are no gaping oversights or questionable areas in the process
offered students charged with violation of school rules, legal
challenges may not even arise.
If a student being considered for short-term suspension
alleges that a teacher's allegations against him are founded in
the teacher's being out to get him, there will be little economy
lost in confirming the teacher's allegations by conferring with
other students or teachers, even though this is not required by
the Goss decision. The time spent in further investigation may
serve the real purpose of procedural due process, assuring the
likelihood of correct decisions, and may eliminate, or make
more defensible, the legal challenges made regarding the
principal's action or inaction. Why spend legal fees and educational time defending decisions refusing cross-examination of
teachers available for hearings, the making of verbatim records, or providing written decisions outlining the finding of
facts in expulsion proceedings? None of these elements of additional procedural due process will overburden the school, but
they may deter lawsuits from being filed, and they certainly
will make it more likely that lawsuits will be won by schools.
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For schools that want to extend reasonably full constitutional procedural due process to students, both for their own
self-protection and to serve as role models in the education of
impressionable youth, the task is not difficult. In situations of
short-term suspensions, or other deprivations arguably involving liberty or property interests, follow the Goss requirements
of no removal prior to rudimentary hearing and oral or written
notice of the alleged misconduct. If the student denies the allegations, an explanation of the evidence and a chance for the
student to present the student's position must be provided. If
an emergency need to remove the student is present, provide
the hearing as soon as reasonably possible thereafter. Although
not required, if the student raises credible issues of fact, follow
up with additional investigation or give the student a reasonable opportunity to provide evidence.
If the issue involves a long-term suspension or expulsion, it
is better to provide greater due process than is minimally required, than to provide questionably adequate due process,
inviting legal challenge. Generally, the student should not be
punished by removal or by any other action prior to the hearing. If the student must be removed immediately for the protection of the student or others, a separate rudimentary hearing can be held for that purpose. Notice of the proposed longterm suspension or expulsion hearing should be in writing and
should provide the time, place, and date of the hearing, as well
as an explanation of the charges in sufficient detail to allow
preparation of a defense. Sometime prior to the hearing, the
student may be provided a list of likely witnesses and a brief
summary of their planned testimony. If the student reasonably
requests additional time to obtain legal counsel or gather evidence for the defense against charges, continuances should be
granted. If the student contests the allegations, the student
should be provided ample opportunity to present evidence in
support of the defense of the charges. While subpoena of witnesses may not be required, school officials should encourage
witnesses requested by the student to attend the hearing. The
student should be allowed to examine all evidence presented
and to cross-examine all available witnesses. Mfidavits and
hearsay evidence should be kept to a minimum and student
witnesses should testify unless it can be established that retaliation is a strong possibility. Hearsay evidence should be substantiated by other evidence so that decisions are not based
wholly on hearsay evidence. The student should have a right to
be represented by legal counsel or other adult representative,
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but the school should not be responsible for the student's defense expenses. A verbatim record should be made by electronic
recording or stenographer. The decision should be in writing
and should include findings of facts with regard to each allegation against the student. Discipline can be handed out regarding each allegation. All allegations don't have to be proven in
order for discipline to be administered. Decisions should be
based only on evidence introduced at the hearing and subject to
cross-examination by the student - facts not in evidence at the
hearing should not be considered. Persons involved in the prosecution of the student should not be present at the deliberation
stage, unless the student is also allowed to be present. Decision
makers should excuse themselves from the process when information is present that would indicate that they may not be
objective in making a decision.
Obviously, not all of the foregoing elements of procedural
due process are required in all circumstances or in all jurisdictions. They merely represent the items of due process that
public school officials should observe for purposes of better
decision making, being a role model, fairness, exhibiting good
educational principles, and lessening the likelihood of being in
or losing a lawsuit.
Time, money, and effort will eventually disclose what minimal procedural due process elements are required on almost
any set of facts in any jurisdiction. Additional school officials'
time, money, and effort will be used in defending the use of
minimal procedural due process in court. But educators' time,
money and effort can be better spent in other pursuits if they
plan ahead to provide more than minimal due process to students. They will at the same time be modeling valuable lessons
to students that will have a positive impact on the future of the
country. Students will learn to treat others fairly when they
are treated fairly.

